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Abstract
This study used Granger causality and then error correction model to investigate the 
determinants of foreign direct investment inflow to Nigeria during the period 1970 – 
2009. The results show that causality runs from government policy, fiscal incentives, 
availability of natural resources and trade openness to FDI without reverse or feed 
back effect. The parsimonious result of the error correction model reveals that past 
foreign  investment  flows  could  significantly  stimulate  current  investment  inflows. 
Also, while inadequate natural resources reduce the inflow of FDI, fiscal incentives, 
favorable  government  policy,  exchange  rate  and  infrastructural  development  are 
found to be a positive and significant function of FDI in Nigeria. Market size (at lags 
2 and 3) and trade openness are positively signed while political risk is negatively 
signed.  These  variables,  however  impact  insignificantly  on  FDI.  Thus,  fiscal 
incentives, favorable government policy and infrastructural development are positive 
predictors of FDI inflows and should be used as policy instruments. In  the  light  of 
these findings, recommendations such as government, improving on the country’s 
market size through its monetary and fiscal policy and revitalizing the agricultural 
sector for extraction of raw materials were made.
Keywords: foreign direct investment, error correction model, determinants of 
FDI,   natural resources, fiscal incentives, trade openness
1
1.0 Introduction 
Foreign investment policies in Nigeria, since independence, have 
been crafted  to  reflect  the  posture  of  vogue development  strategies. 
Prior to 1970 much of the non – agricultural sector was controlled by 
large foreign – owned trading companies which had a monopoly on the 
distribution of imported goods (Ogunkola et al, 2006). Between 1963 and 
1972,  an  average  of  65%  of  total  capital  was  in  foreign  hands 
(Biersteker, 1987).
In  1972,  the  government  pursued  a  policy  of  progressive 
elimination  of  foreign  dominance,  in  terms  of  both  ownership  and 
management  and  technical  control  through an  indigenization  scheme 
and preferential credit to nurture indigenous entrepreneurs. 
As a consequence, the Nigeria enterprises promotion decree was 
promulgated  in  1972  and  foreign  equity  ownership  in  local  business 
concerns  was  limited  to  a  maximum  of  60  per  cent.  The  drive  of 
indigenization was extended in 1977 with the amended decree further 
reducing foreign ownership to not more than 40 per cent. 
Government investment was no longer limited to public utilities as 
it  increased its  participation in  industry through new investments  and 
nationalization of some categories of foreign – owned business.  Thus, 
expansion of agro – industry, growth of petroleum and petrochemicals, 
diversification of the textile industry, development of the iron and steel 
industry,  installation  of  car  assembly  plants,  and  export  –  oriented 
industry were top of  the list.  This  new strategy was encouraged and 
facilitated by the 1973 – 1975 “oil boom”, which saw government’s total 
revenue increase by 500% in just one year (Ogunkala et al, 2006).
In September 1986, the structural adjustment programme meant to 
restructure the economy and lay the part for self – sustaining growth was 
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adopted  to  resuscitate  the  vagaries/exigencies  of  the  balance  of 
payments  crisis  resulting  from  the  oil  glut  in  the  world  oil  market. 
Government  in  pursuance  of  this  aim  invested  enormously  in  a 
diversified  portfolio  of  industrial  projects  which  relatively  yielded  poor 
returns. This scenario led to government’s realization that accelerated 
industrial  development  hinged  critically  on  increased  private  sector 
participation. The abolition of the import licensing system, reduction and 
adjustment of  import  duties and tariffs,  privatization of  state – owned 
enterprises,  and the introduction of  the second tier  foreign exchange 
market  (SFEM)  leading  to  the  devaluation  and  managed float  of  the 
previously pegged naira were steps taken by the government to support 
this programme.
Though financial incentives such as outright grants and loans at 
concessional interest rates; fiscal incentives including tax holidays and 
reduced tax rates; and other incentives such as subsidized infrastructure 
or services, market preferences and regulatory concessions, including 
exemptions from labour and environmental laws were open to investors 
yet this is at the face of 40% foreign equity participation in Nigeria. Thus,
government  incentives  over  these  years  were  superficial  and/or 
inadequate and discouraged sizable FDI inflows.  
In 1995, the Nigeria investment promotion commission (NIPC) was 
established through decree 16 of 1995. The decree repealed the existing 
inhibition and provided for foreign investors to set up a business with 
100%  ownership  which  must  be  registered  with  corporate  affairs 
commission (CAC) in accordance with the provision of companies and 
Allied matters decree of 1990. Registration is finalized with the Nigeria 
investment  promotion  commission  (NIPC).  To  ensure  adequate 
protection,  the  NIPC  guaranteed  foreign  investment  against 
nationalization and expropriation by the government. Investment in any 
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sector  was  open  to  foreign  companies.  The  Nigeria  investment 
promotion commission (NIPC) decrees No.36 of 1988 and the Nigeria 
enterprise promotion decree (NEPD) of 1972 as amended in 1977 and 
1988  which  hitherto  reserved  for  Nigerians  the  ownership  of  certain 
business and restricted the inflow of foreign investment became things of 
the  past.  This  open  door  policy  reinvigorated  the  interest  of  foreign 
investors and re-ushered considerable foreign inflows to Nigeria.
This paper therefore sets out to investigate the direction as well as 
magnitude of the determinants of foreign direct investment in Nigeria. To 
do  this,  the  paper  is  divided  into  five  sections.  Section  1  is  the 
introduction, section 2 deals on review of related literature, section 3 is 
the methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical result while section 
5 is the conclusion and recommendations.     
2.0 Review of Related Literature              
In making decisions to invest  abroad, firms are influenced by a 
wide constellation of economic, political, geographic, social and cultural 
issues (Assanie and Singleton, 2002). It is important to note that while 
the list of factors is fairly long, not all determinants are equally important 
to every investor in every location at all times. It is also true that some 
determinants may be more important to a given investor at a given time 
than to another investor (see Ajayi, 2006).
The determinants of FDI are legion. While it is difficult to determine 
the exact quantity and quality of FDI determinants that should be present 
in a location for it to attract a given level of inflows, it is nevertheless 
clear  that  a  critical  minimum of  these  determinants  must  be  present 
before FDI inflows begin to occur (Ngowi, 2001).
However,  some of  the outstanding common factors  determining 
foreign investment in developing countries can be listed as follows.
4
- Size of the Market
- Trade Openness 
-        Government policy
- Labor cost and productivity                  
- Political risk 
- Infrastructural development 
- Exchange rate
- Natural resources
- Investment policy and
- Fiscal incentives 
A  number  of  studies  such  as  that  of  Masayuki  and  Ivohasina 
(2005), Wafure and Nurudeen (2010), Raggazi (1993), Obadan (1982), 
Moore (1993), emphasized the importance of the size of the market and 
growth in attracting FDI. Ajayi (2006) maintained that market size and 
growth  have  proved  to  be  the  most  prominent  determinants  of  FDI, 
particularly for those FDI flows that are market seeking. In countries with 
large markets, the stock of FDI is expected to be large since market size 
is a measure of market demand in the country. This is particularly true 
when the host country allows the exploitation of economies of scale for 
import – substituting investment. For sub – Saharan Africa as a whole, 
Bhattacharya  et  al  (1996)  identified  GDP  growth  as  a  major  factor. 
According  to  them,  only  three  Sub  Saharam  African  low  –  income 
countries are amongst the nine main recipients of FDI flows in recent 
years, and of these only Nigeria is close to being classified as a large 
market when judged by the UNCTAD’s benchmark of $36bn GNP.
Other researchers like Obadan (1982),  Anyanwu (1998), Asiedu 
(2002),  Chakrabarti  (2001),  Masayiki  and Ivohasina (2005),  Nwankwo 
(2006), Dinda (2009), Wafure and Abu (2010), who studied determinant 
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of FDI in Nigeria asserted that FDI is a positive and significant function of 
market size.  
The costs as well as the skills of labour are identified as the major 
attractions  for  FDI.  The  cost  of  labour  is  important  in  location 
considerations,  especially  when  investment  is  export  oriented  (see 
Wheeler and Mody (1992); Mody and Srinivasan, (1998). Lower labour 
cost  reduces  the  cost  of  production,  all  other  factors  remaining 
unchanged.  Sometimes,  the  availability  of  cheep  labour  justifies  the 
relocation of a part of the production process in foreign countries. We 
comment here that quality labour or so to say the extent of the labour 
force of a country may attract FDI and not necessarily cheap labour as 
cheap labour as it sounds cheap may not give full productive capacity. 
ODI (1997) reported that the rapid growth in FDI to Vietnam has 
also been attributed primarily to the availability of low – cost labour in 
India. In contrast, labour market rigidities and relatively high wages in the 
formal sector have been seen as deterring any significant inflows into the 
export sector in particular (ODI, 1997).  
The availability of good infrastructure as crucial for attracting FDI is 
well documented in the literature, regardless of the type of FDI. It is often 
stated that good infrastructure increases the productivity of investment 
and therefore stimulates FDI flows (Asiedu, 2002). A study by Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) found infrastructure to be very important and dominant 
for  developing  countries.  In  talking  about  infrastructure,  it  should  be 
noted  that  this  is  not  limited  to  roads  alone,  but  includes 
telecommunications.  Availability  and  efficiency  of  telephones,  for 
example, is necessary to facilitate communication between the host and 
home  countries.  In  addition  to  physical  infrastructure,  financial 
infrastructure is important for FDI inflow. A well  – developed financial 
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market is known from available evidence to enable a country tap the full 
benefits of FDI.
Country risk is very important to FDI. Several studies have found 
FDI in developing countries to be affected negatively by economic and 
political uncertainty. There is abundant evidence to show that there is 
negative relationship between FDI and political and economic stability. In 
a  study  on  foreign  owned  firms in  Africa,  Sachs  and  Sievers  (1998) 
concluded  that  the  greatest  concern  is  political  and  macroeconomic 
stability,  while Lehman (1999) and Jaspersen et al. (2000) found that 
countries that are less risky attract more FDI. Perception of risk in Africa 
countries is still very high and could hinder foreign direct investment.
The  ranking  of  political  risk  among  FDI  determinants  remains 
somewhat unclear where the host country possesses abundant natural 
resources, as is seen in politically unstable countries such as Nigeria 
and  Angola,  where  high  returns  in  the  extractive  industries  seem to 
compensate for political instability (ODI,1997).
Openness of an economy is also known to foster the inflows of 
FDI. The more open an economy is, the more likely it is that it would 
follow appropriate  trade  and exchange rate  regimes and the  more  it 
would attract FDI.
One indicator of openness is the relative size of the export sector. 
Singh  and  Jun’s  (1995)  study  indicated  that  exports,  particularly 
manufacturing exports, are a significant determinant of FDI flows and 
their tests showed that there is strong evidence that exports precede FDI 
flows. China, in particular, has attracted much foreign investment into the 
export sector.
The  institutional  environment  is  an  important  factor  because  it 
directly affects business operations. In this category is a wide array of 
factors that can promote or deter investment. The first of these is the 
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existence of corruption and bribery. Corruption deters the inflow of FDI 
because it is an additional cost and because wherever it exists, it creates 
uncertainty,  which inhibits the flow of FDI. The second is the level of 
bureaucracy involved in establishing a business in a country. Complex 
and  time  –  consuming  procedures  deter  investment.  The  third 
institutional factor is the existence of incentives in the form of fiscal and 
financial attractions. A look at the trends of our data shows a remarkable 
dearth of fiscal incentives to foreign direct investment in Nigeria. This 
last factor is only useful to the extent that other favourable factors are 
already in place. 
Fourth, there is also the institution of the judiciary, which is a key to 
protecting property rights and law enforcement regulations. A frequent 
measure  of  this  is  the  rule  of  law,  which  is  a  composite  of  three 
indicators (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003): sound political institutions and 
a strong court system; fairness of the judicial system; and the substance 
of  the  law  itself.  It  is  expected  that  countries  with  better  legal 
infrastructure  will  be  able  to  attract  more  FDI.  Related  here  is  the 
enforceability  of  contracts:  the  lack  of  enforceability  in  many  African 
countries raises risk of capital loss and hinders FDI.
Return on investment is another major determinant of FDI flows. In 
general, FDI will go to countries that pay a higher return on capital. For 
developing  countries,  testing  the  rate  of  return  on  capital  is  difficult 
because most  developing countries do not  have a  well  –  functioning 
capital market (Asiedu, 2002). What is often done is to use the inverse of 
real GDP per capita to measure the return on capital. The implication of 
this is that all things being equal, investment  in countries with higher per 
capita  income should  yield  lower  return  and  therefore  real  GDP per 
capita should be inversely related to FDI (Asiedu, 2002). The empirical 
result of the relationship between real GDP per capita and FDI is mixed. 
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In  works  by  Edwards  (1990)  and  Jaspersen  et  al.  (2000),  using  the 
inverse of  income per  capita as proxy for  the return on capital,  they 
concluded that real GDP per capita and FDI/GDP are negatively related. 
Results of studies by Schneider and Frey (1995) and Tsai (1994) are 
different as they found a positive relationship between the two variables. 
This was based on the argument that a higher GDP per capita implies 
better prospects for FDI in the host country.
Investigating the determinants of FDI in Nigeria, Lousi (1998) using 
error correction specification, came out with the result that both political 
and  economic  factors  constitute  the  major  determinants  of  FDI  in 
Nigeria. In contrary, Anyawu (1998) using cointegration technique, found 
political factors to be insignificant in the determination of FDI in Nigeria 
and  that  economic  factors  are  the  key  determinants.  In  his  finding, 
Ibrahim (2007) established that FDI is a negative and significant function 
of political factor.                         
From the results of their regression analysis, Udeaja et al (2008) 
showed that in five out of the six sectors considered in this study, past 
foreign investment flows could significantly stimulate current flows. This 
lends credence to the “agglomeration effect” thesis. According to them, 
the results obtained from this study supported the need for the Nigerian 
government to reverse the poor investment climate of the past in order to 
avert more severe consequences in the future. The current low FDI flows 
were reflection of the past investment environment.
Apart from this general finding their results also showed that trade 
liberalization is  the key determinant  of  FDI  inflows  in  the agriculture, 
forestry and fishery sector.  Most investors in this sector  are export  – 
oriented  firms;  a  restrictive  trade  policy  would  reduce  the 
competitiveness  of  their  product  in  the  international  market  and, 
therefore, act as a disincentive to invest in Nigeria. 
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FDI inflows in the mining and quarrying sector, on the other hand, 
is  strongly  influenced  by  the  rate  of  return  on  investment  and 
macroeconomic stability apart from past foreign investment in the sector. 
Focusing on Kenya, Elijah (2006) employed an econometric model 
to regress FDI on exogenous variables that include human capital, real 
exchange  rate,  annual  inflation  and  openness  of  the  economy.  The 
author  found  that  economic  openness  and  human  capital  affect  FDI 
inflows positively in the short – run. But inflation and real exchange were 
negatively  related  to  FDI  inflows  in  the  short  –  run  and  long  –  run 
respectively.
Anyanwu (1998) maintained that domestic investment, openness 
and  indigenization  policy  are  very  important  determinants  of  FDI  in 
Nigeria.
Fuat and Ekrem (2002) in examining location related factors that 
influence FDI inflows into the Turkish economy discovered that the size 
of  the  host  country’s  market,  infrastructure  (proxied  by  share  of 
transportation, energy and communication expenditures in GDP) and the 
openness  of  the  economy  (as  measured  by  the  ratio  of  exports  to 
imports) are positively related to FDI inflows.
According to Harvey (1990), in the long – run the negative effects 
of  exchange  rate  volatility  were  more  than  the  positive  effects  in 
attracting  FDI.  Similarly,  Goldberg  and  Kolstad  (1994)  found  high 
exchange  rate  variability  to  be  impediments  to  FDI  inflows  between 
United States and Canada, and Japan and United Kingdom.
According to Ahmet (1996), the movement in the exchange rate 
between  the  Turkish  lira  and  the  Deutsche  mark,  and  interest  rate 
affected  inflows of Deutsche mark into the Turkish economy. 
In Nigeria, Ekpo (1997) examined the relationship(s) between FDI 
and some macroeconomic variables for the period 1970 – 1994. The 
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author’s results showed that political regime, real income per capita, rate 
of inflation, world interest rate, credit rating, and debt service explained 
the variance of FDI inflows to Nigeria.
According to Nwankwo (2006) FDI in Nigeria is mainly affected by 
political  instability,  macro-economic  instability  and  the  availability  of 
natural resources. Anyanwu (1998) maintained that political factor is not 
a determinant of FDI but lent support to the efficacy of economic factors. 
Ibrahim (2007) on the other hand identified market size, real exchange 
rate and political factor as important determinants of FDI.  
ODI (1999) observed that infrastructure covers many dimensions, 
ranging from roads, ports, railways and telecommunication systems to 
institutional development (e.g. accounting, legal services, etc.). Studies 
in  China  reveal  the  extent  of  transport  facilities  and  the  proximity  to 
major ports as having a  significant positive effect on the location of FDI 
within  the  country.  According  to  it,  poor  infrastructure  can  be  seen, 
however, as both an obstacle and an opportunity for foreign investment. 
For the majority of low-income countries, it is often cited as one of the 
major constraints.      
Dinda, (2009) and Nwaknwo (2006) noted that natural resource is 
one of the major determinants of FDI to host country. According to him 
(Dinda,  2009)  FDI  takes  place  when  a  country  richly  endowed  with 
natural resources lack capital or technical skill needed to extract and / or 
sale  to  the  world  market.  The  Nigeria  economy  is  endowed  with 
untapped agro-natural resources, yet the economy is monocultural as it 
concentrates on the tapping of oil  resources thereby creating artificial 
scarcity  of  natural  resources  for  agro-based  industries.  Even  foreign 
investors see oil  as the most viable venture and as such neglect the 
tapping  of  other  resources.  This  lopsidedness  in  exploiting  natural 
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resources  constitutes  artificially  inadequate  natural  resources  to  the 
country.        
3.0 Methodology        
In this study, a systematic time series econometrics approach is 
used to investigate the determinants of FDI flow to Nigeria during 1970 – 
2009. The data were soured from the statistical bulletin of the central 
bank of Nigeria. The Augumented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test is 
used to verify whether the variables are difference stationary.  We used 
the Johansen (1988) cointegration approach to determine the number of 
cointegration  equations  among  the  variables  and  then  the  granger 
causality  test.  Also  error  correction  model  (ECM)  was  used to  verify 
short run dynamics with long-run equilibrium. 
There are several techniques for ECM in econometric evaluation, 
such as the VECM which is more appropriate for multivariate framework, 
however,  for  simplicity,  we  employed  ECM  framework  from  static 
regression.
The data sourced from the statistical bulletin of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria include market size proxied by the real GDP growth, openness 
and  infrastructure  proxied  by  the  ratio  of  export  to  import  and 
government expenditure on transport and communication respectively. 
Natural  resource was represented by the value of  exported oil;  while 
political  risk and investment  policy were proxied by dummy variables 
respectively. 
3.1 Model specification 
The  independent  variables  are  the  size  of  the  market,  trade 
openness,  political  risk,  infrastructural  development,  exchange  rate, 
national  resources,  investment  policy  and  fiscal  incentives  while  the 
dependent variable is the real GDP. The model is stated as follows.     
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FDI = f(Avalabenr, Exchangerate, Fiscincentives, Govtpolicy, Infrastructure, 
        Marketsize, Politicrisk, Topenness)
or
FDI = λ0 + λ1Avalabenr  + λ2Exchangerate  + λ3Fiscincentives  + λ4Govtpolicy 
+λ5Infrastructure +λ6Marketsize  +λ7Politicrisk + λ8 Topenness + Ut
Where 
FDI                  = foreign direct investment  
Avalabenr        = availability of natural resources  
Exchangerate  =  Exchange rate 
  Fiscincentives = fiscal incentives 
Govtpolicy       = Government policy
Infrastructure   = Infrastructural development                     
Marketsize       = Market size
Politicrisk         = Political risk
Topenness      = Trade openness
λi      = parameters to be estimated.
Ut      = stochastic term 
4.0 Empirical Results and Discussions
The results of the Augumented Dickey-Fuller test are presented in 
table.1 in the appendix. These results show that all  the variables are 
integrated of order one, 1(1) at 5 percent level of significance with lag1. 
In other words, they are found to be stationary after differencing once. 
Thus, the model follows integrating process.
In order to determine whether there exist any cointegrating vector 
supporting  the  existence  of  long-run  relationship  between  the  FDI 
variable  and  the  explanatory  variables,  the  researcher  employed  the 
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Johansen cointegration test. The result of the test is presented in table 2 
in the appendix.         
          The test indicates the presence of 3 cointegrating equations at 5 
percent  level  of  significance  for  the  FDI  model  and  therefore 
confirms the existence of long-run equilibrium relationship between 
FDI and its determinants.  This existence suggests that causation 
runs  at  least  from one  variable  to  another.  In  ascertaining  the 
direction  (see  appendix),  it  is  found  that  availability  of  natural 
resources,  government  policy,  fiscal  incentiveness  and  trade-
openess  granger  cause  FDI  without  reverse  or  feed  back  effect 
while FDI only granger causes infrastructure(see table 4).
With these results, one specified the short run dynamic equation 
as an error correction model (ECM) incorporating the one period lagged 
residual  from the static regression. The autoregressive distributed lag 
technique  is  used  with  a  maximum  lag  of  3  to  obtain  an  over-
parameterized  equation.  Finally,  parsimonious  results  were  obtained 
and are presented in table 3 below. 
Table 3. Pasimonious Results of FDI Model
Dependent Variable: FDI
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/11/01   Time: 03:59
Sample(adjusted): 1974 2006
Included observations: 33 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(FDI(-1)) 0.296320 0.143896 2.059261 0.0945
D(FDI(-2)) -0.226938 0.074074 -3.063668 0.0280
D(FDI(--3)) 0.004569 0.019050 0.239847 0.8200
AVALABLENR -0.162506 0.020795 -7.814496 0.0006
D(AVALABLENR(-1)) -0.026584 0.053647 -0.495525 0.6412
D(AVALABLENR(-3)) 0.153564 0.107142 1.433274 0.2112
EXCHANGERATE -393.9102 573.2971 -0.687096 0.5226
D(EXCHANGERATE(
-1))
8239.170 1687.868 4.881406 0.0045
D(EXCHANGERATE(
-2))
6075.830 2109.858 2.879734 0.0346
FISCINCENTIVES 133754.3 48406.10 2.763171 0.0397
D(FISCINCENTIVES( 402089.5 102349.3 3.928601 0.0111
14
-1))
D(FISCINCENTIVES(
-2))
533340.9 148897.0 3.581946 0.0158
D(FISCINCENTIVES(
-3))
178136.2 72836.29 2.445707 0.0582
GOVTPOLICY 133813.6 34910.12 3.833088 0.0122
D(GOVTPOLICY(-1)) 1039919. 53609.62 19.39799 0.0000
INFRASTRUCTURE 22.63286 5.530829 4.092128 0.0094
D(INFRASTRUCTUR
E(-1))
-52.64116 4.191806 -12.55811 0.0001
D(INFRASTRUCTUR
E(-2))
-22.92932 4.486815 -5.110376 0.0037
MARKETSIZE -0.344603 0.138970 -2.479702 0.0559
D(MARKETSIZE(-1)) -0.093086 0.187154 -0.497378 0.6400
D(MARKETSIZE(-2)) 0.131304 0.192196 0.683176 0.5249
D(MARKETSIZE(-3)) 0.338488 0.192223 1.760917 0.1386
D(POLITICRISK(-1)) -15860.36 36101.45 -0.439328 0.6788
TOPENNESS 17741.70 11044.37 1.606402 0.1691
D(TOPENNESS(-1)) 28083.45 22906.31 1.226014 0.2748
D(TOPENNESS(-2)) 23229.15 15871.11 1.463612 0.2032
ECT(-1) -0.178755 0.124271 1.438431 0.2098
C 1307.420 60823.57 0.021495 0.9837
R-squared 0.999146     Mean dependent var 29062.83
Adjusted R-squared 0.994535     S.D. dependent var 313208.5
S.E. of regression 23154.24     Akaike info criterion 22.74764
Sum squared resid 2.68E+09     Schwarz criterion 24.01741
Log likelihood -347.3361     F-statistic 216.6813
Durbin-Watson stat 2.388730     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000005
The result  in  table  3  shows that  past  foreign investment  flows 
could significantly stimulate current investment inflows. This finding is in 
line with the finding of Udeaja et al (2008) in their sectoral  study of 
foreign direct inflows in Nigeria.
Our results also reveal that in the long-run, the available natural 
resources  which have been noted to be artificially  meager in Nigeria 
exert negative and significant impact on foreign direct investment. In 
other words, inadequate natural resources reduce the inflow of FDI. This 
result corroborates with the findings of Asiedu (2002, 2006) and Dinda 
(2009) on the effect of natural resources but contrary to the results of 
Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2003) and Saltz (1992). While fiscal incentives, 
favorable government policy and infrastructural development are found 
to  be  positive  and  significant  function  of  foreign  direct  investment. 
These results are consistent with the findings of Dinda (2009), Asiedu 
15
(2002) and Wheeler and Mody (1992). Market size (at lags 2 and 3) and 
trade-openness have an increasing (positive) but insignificant effect on 
FDI. This contradicts the findings of many researchers such as Obadan 
(1982) Ragazi (1993), Ajayi (2006) and Wafure and Nurudean (2010) 
who found that market size is of significant effect.  The result  of our 
analysis however, corroborates with the findings of Dinda (2009) who 
contends that the assertion, that the market size is a major determining 
factor  for  FDI  might  be  true  for  other  countries  but  not  for  Nigeria 
during 1970 – 2009. 
The FDI  is  positively  and  significantly  related to exchange rate 
while political risk exerts negative and insignificant effect on FDI. That 
political risk is negative but not significant in influencing the flow of FDI 
supports the report of ODI (1997) that in the political unstable countries 
such as  Nigeria  and Angola,  high returns  in  the extractive industries 
seem to compensate for political instability. 
The ECM is negative and shows that about 17.9 percent deviation 
from  the  long-run  equilibrium  relationship  between  FDI  and  its 
determinants are corrected. There is therefore empirical evidence that 
there exist a long-run relationship between FDI and its determinants. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 The  study  used  error  correction  model  to  investigate  the 
determinants of foreign direct investment inflow to Nigeria during the 
period 1970 – 2009. The results show that past foreign investment flows 
could  significantly  stimulate  current  investment  inflows.  Also,  while 
inadequate natural resources reduce the inflow of FDI, fiscal incentives, 
favorable  government  policy,  exchange  rate  and  infrastructural 
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development are found to be positive and significant function of FDI in 
Nigeria. Market size (at lags 2 and 3) and trade openness are positively 
signed while political risk is negatively signed. These variables, however 
impact insignificantly on FDI. In the most recent times not captured in 
this study, political and social uncertainty are on the increase and could 
turn significant  as to erode the hope of  foreign investment inflow in 
Nigeria if not properly checked. 
Thus,  it  is  obvious  that  fiscal  incentives,  favorable  government 
policy  and  infrastructural  development  are  positive  predictors  of  FDI 
inflows and should be used as policy instruments.
Government should improve on the country’s market size through 
its monetary and fiscal policy so as to stimulate it to impact positively 
and  significantly  on  FDI.  The  government  should  as  well  finance 
researches  on  agricultural  sector  for  the  purpose  of  sourcing  raw 
materials for extractive industries.         
The Nigerian economy is mono-cultural (oil dominated) and should 
be  diversified  through  adequate  attention  to  agricultural  sector.  Also 
more  conducive  investment  environment  should  be  created  through 
eliminating  political  and  social  unrest/instability  in  the  country. 
Government should work out means and ways of actualizing this. The 
positive  sign  of  trade openness  suggests  the need to  intensify  trade 
liberalization policy so as to make openness significant, if the inflow of 
capital through FDI is considered desirous.        
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  APPENDIX
Table 1: Unit Root Test
Variables Augmented 
Dickey fuller 
Test statistic 
Max
lay
Order of 
integration 
FDI -4.126792 1 1
Avalablenr -3.222888 1 1
Exchangerate -3.222351 1 1
Fiscincertives -4.123108 1 1
Govtpolicy -5.911383 1 1
Infrastructure -2.989423 1 1
Market size -3.906769 1 1
Political risk -4.301163 1 1
Topeness -6.205653 1 1
Critical values 1% = -36191, 5% = -2.4422, 10% = -2.6092% 
Table 2.Cointegration Test
Date: 09/07/11   Time: 21:50
Sample: 1970 2009
Included observations: 39
Test assumption: 
No deterministic trend in the data
Series: FDI AVALABLENR EXCHANGERATE FISCINCENTIVES GOVTPOLICY INFRASTRUCTURE 
MARKETSIZE POLITICRISK TOPENNESS 
Lags interval: No lags
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s)
 0.832648  249.5060 175.77 187.31       None **
 0.803048  179.7873 141.20 152.32    At most 1 **
 0.641740  116.4204 109.99 119.80    At most 2 *
 0.557115  76.38698  82.49  90.45    At most 3
 0.330701  44.62363  59.46  66.52    At most 4
 0.305506  28.96416  39.89  45.58    At most 5
 0.179826  14.74587  24.31  29.75    At most 6
 0.096323  7.014545  12.53  16.31    At most 7
 0.075569  3.064489   3.84   6.51    At most 8
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x(xx) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level 
L.R. test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Table 4 Granger Causality Test
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 09/16/11   Time: 05:51
Sample: 1970 2009
Lags: 2
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  AVALABLENR does not Granger Cause 
FDI
38  10.0856  0.00038
  FDI does not Granger Cause AVALABLENR  1.88124  0.16838
  EXCHANGERATE does not Granger Cause 
FDI
38  0.77504  0.46889
  FDI does not Granger Cause EXCHANGERATE  0.48784  0.61831
  FISCINCENTIVES does not Granger Cause 
FDI
38  4.41364  0.02002
  FDI does not Granger Cause FISCINCENTIVES  0.01683  0.98332
  GOVTPOLICY does not Granger Cause 
FDI
38  5.40895  0.00929
  FDI does not Granger Cause GOVTPOLICY  0.08323  0.92033
  INFRASTRUCTURE does not Granger 
Cause FDI
38  0.75928  0.47600
  FDI does not Granger Cause INFRASTRUCTURE  19.8865  2.2E-06
  MARKETSIZE does not Granger Cause FDI 38  2.51399  0.09633
  FDI does not Granger Cause MARKETSIZE  0.05802  0.94373
  POLITICRISK does not Granger Cause FDI 38  0.13849  0.87118
  FDI does not Granger Cause POLITICRISK  2.2E-08  1.00000
  TOPENNESS does not Granger Cause FDI 38  5.15993  0.01122
  FDI does not Granger Cause TOPENNESS  0.42719  0.65590
  EXCHANGERATE does not Granger Cause 
AVALABLENR
38  0.12645  0.88164
  AVALABLENR does not Granger Cause 
EXCHANGERATE
 1.36200  0.27017
  FISCINCENTIVES does not Granger Cause 
AVALABLENR
38  0.03241  0.96814
  AVALABLENR does not Granger Cause 
FISCINCENTIVES
 0.15332  0.85846
  GOVTPOLICY does not Granger Cause 
AVALABLENR
38  1.25419  0.29855
  AVALABLENR does not Granger Cause 
GOVTPOLICY
 1.93444  0.16054
  INFRASTRUCTURE does not Granger 
Cause AVALABLENR
38  8.00619  0.00146
  AVALABLENR does not Granger Cause 
INFRASTRUCTURE
 14.9635  2.4E-05
  MARKETSIZE does not Granger Cause 
AVALABLENR
38  2.64133  0.08629
  AVALABLENR does not Granger Cause 
MARKETSIZE
 0.70768  0.50011
  POLITICRISK does not Granger Cause 
AVALABLENR
38  0.29967  0.74306
  AVALABLENR does not Granger Cause 
POLITICRISK
 2.5E-05  0.99998
  TOPENNESS does not Granger Cause 38  0.51284  0.60349
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AVALABLENR
  AVALABLENR does not Granger Cause 
TOPENNESS
 2.55968  0.09259
  FISCINCENTIVES does not Granger Cause 
EXCHANGERATE
38  1.82051  0.17783
  EXCHANGERATE does not Granger Cause 
FISCINCENTIVES
 0.73282  0.48821
  GOVTPOLICY does not Granger Cause 
EXCHANGERATE
38  1.59229  0.21870
  EXCHANGERATE does not Granger Cause 
GOVTPOLICY
 1.30030  0.28604
  INFRASTRUCTURE does not Granger 
Cause EXCHANGERATE
38  1.57400  0.22238
  EXCHANGERATE does not Granger Cause 
INFRASTRUCTURE
 0.50734  0.60671
  MARKETSIZE does not Granger Cause 
EXCHANGERATE
38  0.24957  0.78060
  EXCHANGERATE does not Granger Cause 
MARKETSIZE
 3.18785  0.05423
  POLITICRISK does not Granger Cause 
EXCHANGERATE
38  0.26105  0.77181
  EXCHANGERATE does not Granger Cause 
POLITICRISK
 0.01219  0.98789
  TOPENNESS does not Granger Cause 
EXCHANGERATE
38  0.19723  0.82196
  EXCHANGERATE does not Granger Cause 
TOPENNESS
 0.27953  0.75791
  GOVTPOLICY does not Granger Cause 
FISCINCENTIVES
38  0.37520  0.69004
  FISCINCENTIVES does not Granger Cause 
GOVTPOLICY
 6.01166  0.00594
  INFRASTRUCTURE does not Granger 
Cause FISCINCENTIVES
38  0.19487  0.82388
  FISCINCENTIVES does not Granger Cause 
INFRASTRUCTURE
 0.07718  0.92589
  MARKETSIZE does not Granger Cause 
FISCINCENTIVES
38  0.05809  0.94366
  FISCINCENTIVES does not Granger Cause 
MARKETSIZE
 0.60672  0.55111
  POLITICRISK does not Granger Cause 
FISCINCENTIVES
38  0.19310  0.82532
  FISCINCENTIVES does not Granger Cause 
POLITICRISK
 0.00000  1.00000
  TOPENNESS does not Granger Cause 
FISCINCENTIVES
38  0.15333  0.85846
  FISCINCENTIVES does not Granger Cause 
TOPENNESS
 0.42037  0.66027
  INFRASTRUCTURE does not Granger 
Cause GOVTPOLICY
38  1.09268  0.34714
  GOVTPOLICY does not Granger Cause 
INFRASTRUCTURE
 0.71176  0.49816
  MARKETSIZE does not Granger Cause 
GOVTPOLICY
38  4.90010  0.01370
  GOVTPOLICY does not Granger Cause 
MARKETSIZE
 0.45629  0.63757
  POLITICRISK does not Granger Cause 
GOVTPOLICY
38  2.65753  0.08509
  GOVTPOLICY does not Granger Cause  0.18029  0.83585
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POLITICRISK
  TOPENNESS does not Granger Cause 
GOVTPOLICY
38  0.13256  0.87631
  GOVTPOLICY does not Granger Cause 
TOPENNESS
 1.13839  0.33259
  MARKETSIZE does not Granger Cause 
INFRASTRUCTURE
38  2.07154  0.14207
  INFRASTRUCTURE does not Granger Cause 
MARKETSIZE
 1.18393  0.31874
  POLITICRISK does not Granger Cause 
INFRASTRUCTURE
38  0.05283  0.94863
  INFRASTRUCTURE does not Granger Cause 
POLITICRISK
 0.02675  0.97363
  TOPENNESS does not Granger Cause 
INFRASTRUCTURE
38  1.30673  0.28434
  INFRASTRUCTURE does not Granger Cause 
TOPENNESS
 0.71664  0.49583
  POLITICRISK does not Granger Cause 
MARKETSIZE
38  75.4110  4.9E-13
  MARKETSIZE does not Granger Cause 
POLITICRISK
 0.00785  0.99218
  TOPENNESS does not Granger Cause 
MARKETSIZE
38  0.33079  0.72071
  MARKETSIZE does not Granger Cause 
TOPENNESS
 1.40129  0.26055
  TOPENNESS does not Granger Cause 
POLITICRISK
38  1.09673  0.34582
  POLITICRISK does not Granger Cause 
TOPENNESS
 1.04378  0.36346
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